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MEDIATION IN DEBTOR/ 
CREDITOR RELATIONSHIPS 
The recent crisis in agriculture has resulted in a record num-
ber of farm and bank failures in agricultural states.1 The atten-
dant social and economic turmoil, which sometimes has included 
violence, 2 in communities dependent upon agriculture has fo-
cused attention on the relationship between debtor and creditor 
and their respective rights in collateral. 
Where the debtor is in default and the secured lender pursues 
its legal remedies, whether through judicial action3 or self-help 
repossession without the consent of the debtor,• a permanent 
breakdown in the debtor/creditor relationship occurs. From the 
qebtor's perspective, the opportunity to repay debt is often cut 
off because the property necessary to operate a business is no 
longer available. 6 The creditor is similarly deprived of any op-
1. See Nash, A Line of Defense Under Stress, N.Y. Times, Mar. 10, 1986, at Al6, col. 
4 (reporting the FDIC's struggle with a huge workload as a result of the largest number 
of bank failures since the Depression); Schneider, As More Family Farms Fail, Hired 
Managers Take Charge, N.Y. Times, Mar. 17, 1986, at Al, col. 5 (reporting a wave of 
farm failures that is swamping lenders with property, contributing to the rapid growth of 
professional farm management services); Schneider, Farm Loan System's Huge Loss, 
N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1986, at Dl, col. 6 (reporting that the Farm Credit System, the 
nation's largest agricultural lender, posted the biggest loss in its 70-year history). 
2. Malcolm, Troubled Farmers: Debts and Guns, N.Y. Times, Dec. 12, 1985, at A20, 
col. 4. 
3. Court-enforced repossession of personal property generally consists of actions 
under replevin or claim and delivery statutes. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF 
THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 1102-03 (2d ed. 1980). Where real prop-
erty subject to mortgage is involved, foreclosure is the judicial remedy. 36A C.J.S. Fore-
closure (1960). 
4. U.C.C. § 9-503 states: "Unless otherwise agreed a secured party has on default the 
right to take possession of the collateral. In taking possession a secured party may pro-
ceed without judicial process if this can be done without breach of the peace or may 
proceed by action." 
5. See Penney v. First Nat'! Bank, 385 Mass. 715, 433 N.E. 2d 901 (1982). Penney, a 
commercial fisherman, borrowed $32,802.39 from the bank and executed a security 
agreement involving his lobster boat on March 28, 1975. After making several payments 
and incurring additional debt from the bank, Penney defaulted on the note, and on July 
29, October 11, November 4, and December 30, 1977, the bank wrote to Penney demand-
ing all of the sums due. Penney made further payments after every letter except the last, 
although he remained in default throughout the period. The bank seized the lobster boat 
without notice on January 19, 1978. As a consequence of the repossession, Penney lost 
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portunity for future repayment and he incurs collection costs 
that potentially increase the amount of any deficiency and limit 
any excess that would be available for the debtor. 
Economic and social costs follow from terminating the debtor/ 
creditor relationship. A negotiated agreement, which either 
restructures the terms of repayment, or, if repayment is infeasi-
ble, provides for voluntary surrender of the collateral, may eff ec-
tively reduce these costs. 
Two states that have substantial interests in agricultural 
debtor/creditor relationships have attempted to limit the social 
and economic costs of prematurely terminating the debtor/credi-
tor relationship. Iowa and Minnesota have adopted a statutory 
requirement that the creditor offer to submit to mediation prior 
to taking any debt collection action against an agricultural bor-
rower. 6 This Note argues that requiring creditors to offer media-
tion as a statutory prerequisite to debt collection is an effective 
means of reducing the social and economic costs of the prema-
ture termination of a debtor/creditor relationship in business 
contexts. Part I examines the conceptual foundations of the me-
diation process and analyzes the viability of extending mediation 
to debtor/creditor relationships, concluding that mediation can 
provide effective assistance in negotiating an alternative solution 
to repossession of collateral. Part II examines the mediation 
statutes of two agricultural states. An evaluation of empirical 
data from the Iowa Farmer/Creditor Mediation Service demon-
strates that mediation has proved successful in resolving agricul-
tural debtor/creditor disputes. Part III explores the feasibility of 
requiring mediation in debtor/creditor relationships outside of 
agriculture, including business and consumer loan contexts. Al-
though mediation is probably more . appropriate and cost-eff ec-
tive in the case of business loans, possibilities also exist for ap-
plication to consumer loans above a threshold amount. 
$34,000 worth of fishing equipment at sea. At the time of the repossession, Penney owed 
the bank $19,000. The debt was secured by the boat and by real estate, valued at 
$18,500, pledged by a guarantor. The bank sold the boat for $13,500, but did not exercise 
its rights against the guarantor. As a result of the repossession, both Penney and the 
bank sustained unnecessary losses. 
6. Act effective May 23, 1986, H.F. 2473, 1986 Iowa Legis. Serv. 21 (West) (No. 7) 
[hereinafter Iowa H.F. 2473); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 583.20-.32 (West Supp. 1987). The 
Illinois legislature has considered similar legislation. H.B. 3357, 84th Gen. Assembly, 
Reg. Sess. (Ill. 1986). 
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I. CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATION OF MEDIATION 
The distinction between mediation and· other dispute resolu-
tion methods has been the source of considerable confusion 
among legal professionals.7 On a spectrum, with negotiation at 
one end and formal adversary proceedings at the other, 'media-
tion is properly considered a step beyond negotiation.8 Unlike an 
arbitrator, a mediator is not the ultimate decisionmaker who im-
poses a result upon the disputants. The mediator's goal is to re-
solve the dispute by helping the parties negotiate an agreement 
appropriate to their needs and circumstances,9 which often in-
volves going beyond the formal legal prescriptions that define 
the rights of the parties in the relationship.10 Mediation is a rad-
ical departure from the judicial process and from arbitration be-
cause it is committed to resolving disputes voluntarily through 
communication and compromise: a third party does not force a 
solution upon the disputants. 11 
Although mediation is designed to be adapted to the particu-
lar needs of the parties, it is not totally unstructured and gener-
ally proceeds through common phases. An analysis of these 
phases is helpful in understanding the mediator's role in dispute 
resolution. 
A. The Mediation Process 
The mediation process typically begins with a period of prepa-
ration in which the disputants obtain background information 
on their potential claims, defenses, and remedies. 12 The media-
tor may request information from the disputants or engage in 
other background research to familiarize himself with the dis-
7. Cooley, Arbitration v. Mediation-Explaining the Differences, 69 JUDICATURE 263 
(1986); see also Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 29, 29-30 (1982). 
8. J. MARKS, E. JOHNSON & P. SzANTON, DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN AMERICA 39 (1984). 
9. Fuller, Mediation-Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 305, 325 (1971). 
"[T]he central quality of mediation ... [is] its capacity to reorient the parties toward 
· each other, not by imposing rules on them, but by helping them to achieve a new and 
shared perception of their relationship, a perception that will redirect their attitudes and 
dispositions toward one another." Id . . 
10. Id. at 308. "[M]ediation is commonly directed, not toward achieving conformity 
to norms, but toward the creation of the relevant norms themselves." Id. Professor Fuller 
notes that this is particularly true in a contract negotiation, with no pre-existing struc-
ture that can guide mediation. Id. 
11. R. COULSON, PROFESSIONAL MEDIATION OF CIVIL DISPUTES 17-18 (1984). 
12. Cooley, supra note 7, at 269. 
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pute. 18 Although the mediator need not be an expert in the sub-
ject matter of the dispute, the mediator should appreciate the 
constraints and pressures acting upon each of the parties in the 
environment of the dispute. 14 
After the preparation phase, the parties typically proceed to 
the initial phase of negotiation. The approach in this phase may 
vary substantially, depending upon the experience and back-
ground of the disputants as well as the orientation of the media-
tor, 111 but generally the mediator introduces the disputants to 
one another and to the negotiation process. 16 The next phase is 
the statement of the problem, where each party separately iden-
tifies and discusses the issues in the dispute. 17 A problem clarifi-
cation phase follows, where the mediator may ask questions or 
summarize areas of agreement and disagreement in order to de-
fine and focus the interests of the parties.18 The mediator may 
choose to hold separate confidential meetings with each of the 
parties where each party can give a candid account of the inter-
nal posture of his interests.19 The disclosure of confidential in-
formation mandates that the mediator be neutral both in ap-
pearance and fact so that a bond of trust may develop. 20 
After the problem is stated and clarified, the parties and the 
mediator begin to suggest possible solutions to the dispute. 21 
From these suggestions, the mediator assists the parties in eval-
uating the alternatives, eliminating unworkable options, and se-
lecting a solution that will produce the optimum result for both 
parties. 22 If successful, an agreement that functions as a contract 
13. Id. 
14. Stuhlberg, The Theory and Practice of Mediation: A Reply to Professor Suss-
kind, 6 VT. L. REV. 85, 95-96 (1981). Professor Stuhlberg notes that the content knowl-
edge of a mediator may depend upon the specific type of dispute. Although at least a 
basic knowledge is desirable, expert knowledge presents the potential difficulty of having 
the parties look toward the mediator for the correct answers, which is contrary to the 
goal of the parties devising their own solutions. 
15. J. FoLBERG & A. TAYLOR, MEDIATION, reprinted in S. GOLDBERG, E. GREEN & F. 
SANDER, DISPUTE RESOLUTION 97, 99 (1985); see also J. MARKS, E. JOHNSON & P. SZANTON, 
supra note 8, at 41 (stating that mediation can involve both facilitative and persuasive 
components, depending upon the approach of the mediator and the substance of the 
dispute). 
16. Cooley, supra note 7, at 269. 
17. Id. 
18. Id. 
19. Fuller, supra note 9, at 318. 
20. Stuhlberg, supra note 14, at 96. 
21. Cooley, supra note 7, at 269. 
22. Id. 
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between the disputing parties concludes the formal mediation 
process.23 
B. Functions of the Mediator 
The mediator serves several important functions in the media-
tion process.2• One of the more pervasive and general functions 
is that of a catalyst: the mediator reacts to each party's concerns 
and acts to reduce unnecessary friction between the parties and 
to provide a constructive environment for communication.26 As a 
neutral third party, the mediator brings a distinct and new per-
spective to the problem that can affect the way that the parties 
view proposed solutions. Although the mediator has no formal 
authority, his position in the process commands the attention of 
the parties, giving him power to make dramatic suggestions, 28 as 
well as to assist the parties to communicate freely and 
effectively. 27 
As an educator,28 the mediator informs and guides the parties 
in applying the concepts of principled negotiation and problem 
solving. 29 The mediator's participation discourages distortions in 
the bargaining process caused by gamesmanship and allows the 
parties to examine their actual interests and achieve the recipro-
cal advantages of a properly negotiated exchange.30 The media-
tor also helps the parties to focus on the implications of not 
reaching an agreement, thus articulating and clarifying the in-
centives for continued participation. 31 
23. Id. 
24. Within the mediation model, the continuum of roles that the mediator may fulfill 
ranges from the rather passive role of a discussion facilitator or convenor of meetings to 
comparatively active roles involving participation in the discussions and providing addi-
tional counseling services to the disputants. See H. RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF 
NEGOTIATION 218-19 (1982). The functions described infra in text accompanying notes 
25-38 contemplate performance on the more active portion of the continuum. 
25. Stuhlberg, supra note 14, at 91-92. 
26. Fuller, supra note 9, at 315; see also Cooley, supra note 7, at 268-69 (discussing 
the comparative power of mediators and arbitrators). 
27. Cooley, supra note 7, at 269. 
28. Stuhlberg, supra note 14, at 92. 
29. R. FISHER & W. URv, PRINCIPLED NEGOTIATION (Draft Ed. 1980), quoted in S. 
GOLDBERG, E. GREEN & F. SANDER, supra note 15, at 93. 
30. Fuller, supra note 9, at 316-22. Professor Fuller uses the example of the "wicked 
partner" ploy as a helpful illustration of the distortion in the bargaining process that 
occurs in the context of mediation between agents. Id. at 321-22. 
31. H. RAIFFA, supra note 24, at 108. The mediator helps the parties clarify their 
values and derive responsible proposals by analY2ing the implications of failing to reach 
agreement with each disputant. Id. 
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Expanding the resources available to the parties is closely re-
lated to the mediator's educating function. 32 Although serving as 
a source of substantive legal knowledge may threaten to destroy 
the mediator's neutrality,33 the mediator's relationship to the 
parties makes him a logical source of referrals for assistance or 
· information to clarify interests and possible remedies in the 
dispute. 
A function that is particularly important where the parties 
meet independently with the mediator is that of the bearer of 
bad news. 34 The mediator can present the position of the other 
party in private conversation, thus allowing emotional response 
without inflaming personal conflicts.311 As a translator, the medi-
ator can provide similar assistance in face-to-face negotiation by 
restating and conveying each party's proposal in language that 
accurately projects the interests of the proposing party without 
unnecessarily alienating the listener.36 
As an agent of reality, the mediator's independence and neu-
trality allow him to confront candidly a party about the possibil-
ity of realizing its desired objective.37 Having access to confiden-
tial information provided by both of the parties, the mediator is 
able to deflate unreasonable claims, thereby minimizing exces-
sive posturing by the parties. 88 
C. Limitations on the Use of Mediation 
Although these functions of mediators certainly do not consti-
tute an exhaustive list,39 they do provide a basis for understand-
ing the advantages of mediation. In addition to the immediate 
benefits of resolving the dispute more efficaciously, mediation al-
lows the parties to come to a more complete understanding of 
one another, their problems, and the constraints on their action. 
32. Stuhlberg, supra note 14, at 93. 
33. See supra note 14. When one of the parties looks to the mediator for legal advice 
regarding how to act against the other, the role of a neutral facilitator is certainly 
compromised. 
34. Stuhlberg, supra note 14, at 93. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. at 92-93. 
37. Id. 
38. H. RAIFFA, supra note 24, at 108-09. 
39. See Stuhlberg, supra note 14, at 94. Professor Stuhlberg also lists the function of 
scapegoat, which is particularly applicable in situations where agents are negotiating for 
principals. When constituents of the agent are disappointed with the settlement, they 
blame the mediator. Thus, a party may proceed with a settlement and save face as well. 
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This understanding provides continuing benefits for parties in 
resolving future disputes, perhaps allowing them to bypass for-
mal dispute resolution procedures. •0 
Mediation is not the answer for all disputes, however, and is 
subject to some conceptual limitations. Professor Fuller has pro-
posed two intrinsic limitations: (1) mediation is generally inap-
propriate when more than two parties are involved,41 and (2) 
mediation presupposes mutual interests of sufficient intensity to 
make the parties willing to collaborate in the mediational 
effort.•2 
According to Professor Fuller, the multiparty environment 
makes neutrality increasingly difficult for the mediator, creating 
a tendency for him to become a participant in the internal 
games of the dispute.43 As the number of relationships increases, 
the complexity of the dispute and the opportunity for misunder-
standing multiply, thus erecting greater barriers for the media-
tor to help the parties overcome.•• 
The requirement of strong mutual interests stems from the 
fact that mediation is generally voluntary. The parties can break 
off negotiations at any time and resort to other means of resolv-
ing the dispute, including arbitration or the formal judicial pro-
cess. Commitment to a good faith effort to reach agreement is 
thus an important element in successful mediation, and lack of 
40. Fuller, supra note 9, at 327. Professor Fuller refers to the example of collective 
bargaining in which the parties, with the help of a mediator, work out a labor contract. 
The communication and understanding developed in negotiating the contract allows the 
parties to make appropriate adjustments without reference to the contract because each 
understands the other's positions. Id. 
41. Id. at 330. Professor Fuller refers to the sociological observations of George Sim-
mel, who concluded that the group of two, the dyad, is at a disadvantage compared to 
larger groups in resolving internal disputes because it lacks opportunity to resolve dis-
putes by the majority principle. Id. at 312. The dyad is at a further disadvantage be-
cause, unlike the group of three, it has no member who is able to assume neutrality on a 
temporary basis and serve as a mediator. Id. at 312-13. 
42. Id. at 330. "Mediation by its very nature presupposes relationships normally af-
fected by some strong internal pull toward cohesion; this is true whether the mediative 
efforts in question be directed toward the formation, modification or dissolution of such 
relationships." Id. at 314. 
43. Id. at 313-14. 
44. The multiparty dispute presents no conceptual problem where the mediator is 
able to assist rival factions to resolve their differences and to clarify common interests so 
that they may become a collective group for purposes of negotiating the primary dispute. 
For example, there may be rival factions within a union during contract negotiations 
with management. If the mediator can assist the union factions to clarify common inter-
ests and negotiate as a collective group, a dyad of labor and management is created in 
which the mediator can function with optimal results. Thus, the mediator has worked 
with two dyads, not a three-way dispute. Id. at 314 n.2. · 
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commitment presents a substantial limitation on its effective-
ness in a given dispute. 
D. Conceptual Difficulties in the Debtor/Creditor Context 
Disputants have used mediation extensively in resolving con-
flicts on a personal or community level involving family relation-
ships•11 and neighborhood quarrels.46 In the commercial context, 
mediation is often part of the dispute resolution process in labor 
relations.•1 Mediation is desirable in these situations because the 
parties are dependent upon consensual agreement, rather than 
third party imposition of a rule-based decision, to resolve the 
dispute.48 
Mediation is particularly appropriate in disputes involving 
community relationships because the adversary system and the 
winner-take-all approach of adjudication is inadequate for 
resolving many disputes.49 Families often seek mediation of 
problems such as child custody, because a solution ordered by a 
court may not meet the needs of the family members as readily 
as would a negotiated agreement.110 Declaring an absolute winner 
and loser becomes unnecessary, as the focus is on achieving har-
mony through a resolution that will satisfy the disputants.111 
In the commercial context, the employer and labor union face 
similar problems in collective bargaining because they depend 
primarily on consensual resolution of the contract dispute rather 
45. Clark & Orbeton, Mandatory Mediation of Divorce: Maine's Experience, 69 Ju-
DICATURE 310 (1986). 
46. Davis, Community Mediation in Massachusetts, 69 JUDICATURE 307 (1986). 
Landlord/tenant and merchant/consumer disputes are also mediated with some regular-
ity. Id. For a list of dispute resolution programs and services that includes general de-
scriptions of categories o( cases handled and resolved, see SPECIAL COMM. ON ALTERNA-
TIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION, PUBLIC SERVS. ACTIVITIES Div., AMERICAN BAR Ass'N, DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION PROGRAM DIRECTORY (1983) [hereinafter ABA DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
DIRECTORY]. 
47. J. DUNLOP, DISPUTE RESOLUTION 140 (1984). 
48. 
In most mediations, the emphasis is not on determining rights or interests, or 
who is right and who is wrong, or who wins and who loses because of which rule; 
these would control the typical adjudicatory proceeding. The focus, instead, is 
upon establishing a degree of harmony through a resolution that will work for 
these disputants. 
Riskin, supra note 7, at 34. 
49. Davis, supra note 46, at 307. 
50. Clark & Orbeton, supra note 45, at 310. 
51. Riskin, supra note 7, at 34. 
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than legal rules that define their rights.112 Even if a court or arbi-
tration panel were available to impose a solution to a contract 
dispute, the parties have a mutual interest in reaching an agree-
ment by themselves: subjecting one's interests to the risk of 
complete frustration by a neutral decisionmaker creates a signif-
icant disincentive to resort immediately to arbitration or r 
adjudication.113 
Although similar in many respects to such relationships, the 
debtor/creditor relationship has distinct characteristics that may 
conflict with the mediation model's characteristic mutuality of 
interests, dyadic relationships,· and neutral mediator. 
1. Limited mutuality because of rights-consciousness-
Once the creditor establishes that the debtor has defaulted, 114 the 
law defines the balance of the debtor's and creditor's rights in 
the collateral.1111 The parties' consciousness of their rights affects 
the way in which they approach mediation because the dispute 
is usually not about whether the creditor has a legal right to the 
collateral, but about when and how those legal rights will be 
exercised. 
The fact that the creditor is assured of getting the value of the 
collateral bargained for in the original loan agreement may re-
duce the creditor's commitment to resolving the dispute through 
mediation. Putting aside intangible concerns about business re-
lationships and reputation in the community,116 the creditor's 
52. See generally Fuller, supra note 9, at 314-20 (emphasizing the interdependence 
of the parties and the complexity of calculations pursued in determining the terms of a 
contract). 
53. Robert Coulson, President of the American Arbitration Association, makes this 
observation in the context of arbitration. R. COULSON, supra note 11, at 11. It is equally 
applicable in any situation where parties can lose control of the decision to a third party. 
54. "Default" is not defined in the U.C.C. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 3, 
at 1085. The authors of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code (UCCC) suggest that: "By 
its nature [default] is not a term that is agreed to by the parties but rather one that is 
dictated by the creditor." UCCC § 5.109 comment 1 (1974); see also O'Connor & Baron, 
Consumer Defaults and the Commercial Code-Some Old Ideas and New Relief, 10 
U.C.C. L.J. 222, 226 (1978). 
55. A possible exception is a dispute between a purchaser/debtor and seller/creditor 
where the purchaser may have claims against the seller/creditor that could be set off 
against the debt. See Mentschikoff, Peaceful Repossession Under the Uniform Commer-
cial Code: A Constitutional and Economic Analysis, 14 WM. & MARYL. REV. 767, 775-78 
(1973); White, The Abolition of Self-Help Repos11ession: The Poor Pay Even More, 1973 
Wis. L. REv. 503, 527-28. 
56. See Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 
AM. Soc. REV. 55 (1963). Professor Macaulay found that concerns about reputation in the 
business community are an important nonlegal consideration affecting behavior in rela-
tionships among business persons in contractual situations. Id. at 64. The effect of com-
munity expectations is difficult to quantify but should not be ignored in the debtor/ 
creditor relationship. 
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primary interest in negotiating a settlement is securing economic 
gains greater than or equal to those from repossession and sale 
of the collateral. The undersecured creditor will arguably have a 
greater incentive to pursue a restructured agreement, because he 
is more likely to incur loss than a fully secured creditor. 
2. Problem of reconciling multiparty interests- Another 
potential difficulty is present when a default situation involves 
the interests of more than one creditor. Considering multiple in-
terests may reduce the advantages of Professor Fuller's dyad 
model. 117 Including the creditors as a class with common interests 
may eliminate conceptual difficulties.H Commonality may not 
always be possible, however, due to the potential frustration of 
creditors' independent rights against the debtor by an agree-
ment with one creditor that affects the security of payments to 
others. A legislature should consider the constraint of the multi-
plicity of relationships and their interdependence on the media~ 
tion model in deciding whether to make mediation a statutory 
requirement. Experience has shown, however, that the problems 
of multi party mediation are not insurmountable. 119 
3. Risk of dominance by creditor- In addition to limiting 
the creditor's commitment to extrajudicial resolution of the dis-
pute, the ultimate right to repossess collateral may also give the 
creditor an advantage in exacting concessions from the debtor.60 
Where the creditor possesses superior bargaining power, media-
tion presents a potential means of circumventing the legal con-
straints intended to protect the debtor.61 
Where one party is more cognizant of his legal rights than the 
other, the mediator faces the further difficulty of maintaining 
neutrality. If the creditor exacts a settlement from the debtor 
that would leave him in a worse position than if he filed for 
bankruptcy or allowed the collateral to be repossessed, the medi-
ator may have a limited responsibility to ensure that the agree-
57. See supra note 41. 
58. See supra note 44. 
59. See infra text accompanying notes 115-16. 
60. See RiMkin, supra note 7, at 35. Professor Riskin advocates that society carefully 
adjust the role of lawyers in the mediation process to reduce the risk of dominance by 
the stronger or more knowledgeable party. Id. "To reduce the danger that less powerful 
persons unwittingly will give up legal rights that would be important to them, they must 
be afforded a way of knowing about the nature of the adversary process and the result it 
would likely produce." Id. 
61. See J. MARKS, E. JOHNSON & P. SZANTON, supra note 8, at 53-54. 
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ment is fair by informing the parties of rights that may be 
violated. 62 
The merits of imposing responsibility upon the mediator for 
the result achieved in negotiations have been debated in the 
context of environmental mediation.63 Imposing this responsibil-
ity, however, presents a danger of reducing the institutional 
credibility and perceived neutrality of the mediator. Allowing 
the mediator to direct the parties to resources that would assist 
in evaluating proposals mitigates the problem of unfairness, 
while maintaining the mediator's neutral posture toward both 
parties. 
The mediator should exercise his role of expander of resources 
with care. From the creditor's perspective, the danger is that the 
mediator will turn into an advocate for the debtor, representing 
another means for the system to hinder the debt collection pro-
cess. From the debtor's perspective, not having the proper pro-
62. See R. COULSON, supra note 11, at 18. Coulson raises this issue and presents his 
analysis: 
Agreements between equally knowledgeable disputants usually come close to 
what an objective person·would deem fair. That may not be the case when agree-
ments are entered into between parties of flagrantly different bargaining 
strengths or ability. . .. A mediator should avoid such situations by persuading 
the parties not to· rush into a premature agreement and by encouraging a weaker 
party to obtain legal advice. 
Id. at 18. Coulson concedes that "some bad bargains are inevitable." Id. The Commercial 
Mediation Rules of the American Arbitration Association make no specific provisions for 
this ethical problem. Id. at 42-45. 
At least one professional code of conduct has addressed this issue. See CENTER FOR 
DISPUTE RESOLUTION, DENVER, COLO., CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS, 
reprinted in S. GOLDBERG, E. GREEN & F. SANDER, supra note 15, at 116-22. Although 
noting that the mediator's satisfaction with the settlement is secondary to that of the 
parties, it gives the mediator the option to inform the parties of his reservations, to 
withdraw without notification of the reason, or to withdraw and privately or publicly 
disclose the reasons for his actions. Id. at 120. 
Reconciling the alternative of allowing public disclosure with the duty of confidential-
ity is difficult, but may be akin to the proposed Michigan version of the MODEL RULES OF 
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(l) (1983). This rule allows a lawyer to disclose confi-
dential information "to prevent the client from committing a criminal or fraudulent act 
that the lawyer reasonably believes is likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm, 
or in substantial injury to the financial interests or property of another" (emphasis 
added). 
63. See Susskind, Environmental Mediation and the Accountability Problem, 6 VT. 
L. REV. 1 (1981). Professor Susskind contends that a special problem is presented in the 
environmental mediation context because the solution reached by the parties may have 
adverse effects on others, such as surrounding communities, who are not parties to the 
mediation. He concludes that environmental mediators should be held accountable for 
the results achieved. Id. at 6-8. However, Stuhlberg, supra note 14, states: "Susskind's 
demand for a non-neutral intervenor is conceptually and pragmatically incompatible 
with the goals and purposes of mediation .... It is precisely a mediator's commitment 
to neutrality which ensures responsible actions on the part of the mediator and permits 
mediation to be an effective, principled dispute settlement procedure." Id. at 86. 
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tection may create the impression that the mediation system is 
merely a means of cheap and expedient justice for the creditor.64 
Neither of these risks should become reality in a mediation sys-
tem because they will weaken the mutual commitment essential 
to negotiating an alternative to repossession. 
E. Practical Difficulties: Problems of Forum and Funding 
Added to the theoretical limitations on the use of mediation in 
debtor/creditor disputes are practical limitations. These include 
problems of forum-who serves as mediator and where the me-
diation takes place,611 and the problems of funding-who bears 
the cost of mediation and how costs are assessed. 66 The ap-
proach of two agricultural states in implementing mediation pro-
grams for debtor/creditor disputes reveals practical solutions to 
these problems.67 
II. APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM IN AGRICULTURAL STATES: 
MEDIATION AS A STATUTORY PREREQUISITE TO DEBT COLLECTION 
In response to the agricultural credit crisis,68 Iowa and Minne-
sota adopted legislation that requires creditors to submit to me-
64. J. MARKS, E. JOHNSON & P. SZANTON, supra note 8, at 51-52. 
65. Properly choosing who serves as mediator is essential to the success of a media-
tion program because it affects the parties' perceptions of the legitimacy of the process. 
A mediator who is neutral, in appearance and in fact, facilitates mutual commitment to a 
negotiated settlement. 
66. Funding may also affect the mutual commitment to the process of negotiated 
settlement. For example, total funding by creditors threatens the appearance of neutral-
ity although proper controls may preserve actual neutrality. See Milstein & Ratner, Con-
sumer Credit Counseling Service: A Consumer-Oriented View, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 978 
(1981), where the authors examined a Consumer Credit Counseling Service in New York. 
Although the service was formed for the purpose of helping debtors in trouble, the au-
thors stated that the close ties to creditors made it "virtually impossible ... to re-
present debtors." Id. at 986. Marks, Johnson, and Szanton also express this concern, 
stating that associating a dispute resolution service with an institution that is affiliated 
with the more powerful party reinforces perceived imbalances. J. MARKS, E. JOHNSON & 
P. SzANTON, supra note 8, at 53. 
67. See infra text accompanying notes 91-102. 
68. 
The general assembly finds that the agricultural sector of the economy of this 
state is under severe financial stress due to low farm commodity prices, continu-
ing high interest rates, and reduced net farm income. The suffering agricultural 
economy also adversely affects economic conditions for all other businesses in 
rural communities. Thousands of this state's farmers are unable to meet current 
payments of interest and principal on mortgages and other loan and land con-
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diation as a statutory prerequisite to collecting debts secured by 
agricultural property.69 The Illinois legislature has considered 
similar legislation.70 
A. Basic Provisions 
The legislation in each of the states provides for the creation 
of an entity or designation of a state official who is responsible 
for providing mediation services.71 Before initiating any proceed-
ing to enforce a debt that exceeds a threshold amount72 against 
agricultural property,73 or taking any self-help action to repos-
tra-cts and are threatened by the loss of their farmland, equipment, crops, and 
livestock through mortgage and lien foreclosures, forfeiture of real estate con-
tracts, and other collection actions. The agricultural economic emergency re-
quires an orderly process with state assistance to adjust agricultural indebted-
ness to preserve the general welfare and fiscal integrity of the state. 
Iowa H.F. 2473, supra note 6, § 1, at 21-22. Minnesota's law contains an almost identical 
provision. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 583.21 (West Supp. 1987)). 
69. Iowa H.F. 2473, supra note 6; Farmer-Lender Mediation Act, ch. 398, art. I, §§ 5-
17, 1986 Minn. Laws 405 (codified as amended at MINN. STAT. ANN.§§ 583.20-.32 (West 
Supp. 1987)) [hereinafter Minn. Farmer-Lender Mediation Act]. Both of these laws in-
clude repealer provisions. Iowa H.F. 2473, supra note 6, § 29, at 32 (to be repealed July 
1, 1989); Minn. Farmer-Lender Mediation Act, supra, art. 1, § 18, at 411 (to be repealed 
July 1, 1988). 
70. H.B. 3357, 84th Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (Ill. 1986). 
71. The Iowa statute empowers an official designated by the attorney general's office 
to contract with a nonprofit corporation to provide the mediation services. Iowa H.F. 
2473, supra note 6, §§ 15-16, at 28-29 (to be codified at lowA CODE §§ 654A.2-.3). The 
statute explicitly provides that this corporation is not a state agency. Id. § 16, at 28-29 
(to be codified at lowA CODE § 654A.3). The Minnesota statute, MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 583.22(5) (West Supp. 1987), designates a state official, the director of the agricultural 
extension service or his designee, to be responsible for the mediation service, but does 
not explicitly provide for reliance upon a private organization. Id. § 583.23. 
72. The secured debt must be more than $5000 in Minnesota, and $20,000 in Iowa. 
MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 550.365(1) (West Supp. 1987); Iowa H.F. 2473, supra note 6, § 17, at 
29 (to be codified at lowA CODE § 654A.4). 
73. Agricultural property is defined as "[a)gricultural land that is principally used for 
farming ... and personal property that is used as security to finance a farm operation or 
used as part of a farm operation including equipment, crops, livestock, and proceeds of 
the security." Iowa H.F. 2473, supra note 6, § 14(1), at 28 (to be codified at lowA CODE 
§ 654A.1). The Minnesota statute initially included "agriculturally related businesses as 
defined by the commission," thus bringing the economic effects on nonfarmers within the 
purposes of the act. Minn. Farmer-Lender Mediation Act, supra note 69, § 7(2), at 405. 
An amendment in the First Special Session' of the Legislature subsequently deleted this 
provision. Act of Apr. 11, 1986, ch. 2, art. 2, § 1(2), 1986 Minn. Laws 1278; see MINN. 
STAT. ANN. § 583.22(2) (West Supp. 1987) (reflecting the amended definition of agricul-
tural property). 
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sess such property,74 a creditor must file a request for mediation 
with the mediation service. 711 
After receiving the request for mediation, the mediation ser-
vice sends notice to the debtor,76 including information about 
the services of financial analysts and lawyers for which the 
debtor may be eligible.77 The debtor must respond to the re-
quest for mediation within a prescribed period.78 Failure to re-
spond constitutes a waiver of the right to mediation.79 The 
debtor may also voluntarily waive the right to mediation.80 The 
mediation service notifies all known creditors of the debtor and 
74. The statutes prohibit actions to "seize" agricultural property. Iowa H.F. 2473, 
supra note 6, § 19(1), at 29-30 (to be codified at lowA CoDE § 654A.6(1)); MINN. STAT. 
ANN. § 583.26(1) (West Supp. 1987). 
75. Iowa H.F. 2473, supra note 6, § 19(1), at 29-30 (to be codified at lowA CoDE 
§ 654A.6(1)); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 583.26(1) (West Supp. 1987). 
76. In Minnesota, the creditor is responsible for serving notice on the debtor. For a 
notice containing the requisite information, see MINN. STAT. ANN. § 581.015(2) (West 
Supp. 1987). 
77. Iowa H.F. 2473, supra note 6, § 20, at 30 (to be codified at IOWA CODE § 654A.7); 
MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 583.26(3) (West Supp. 1987). The laws of both states have made the 
services of lawyers and financial analysts available free of charge to qualifying debtors. 
78. Iowa H.F. 2473, supra note 6, § 20, at 30 (to be codified at IowA CODE§ 654A.7) 
(21 days); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 583.26(2) (West Supp. 1987) (14 days). 
79. Minnesota's statute expressly provides for waiver by nonresponse. MINN. STAT. 
ANN. § 583.26(2)(b) (West Supp. 1987). Waiver by nonresponse is implied in the Iowa 
statute because the mediator has the power to sign a statement that mediation was 
waived if one of the parties fails to sign. The statement constitutes a mediation release. 
Iowa H.F. 2473, supra note 6, § 24, at 31 (to be codified at low A CoDE § 654A.11(3)). The 
Iowa Farmer/Creditor Mediation Service sends notice to the debtor after it receives a 
request for mediation from a creditor. The notice clearly warns the debtor that failure to 
reply constitutes a waiver and empowers the creditor to proceed with foreclosure action. 
80. Express voluntary waiver is not explicitly provided in either statute. In Minne-
sota, failure to request mediation within the prescribed 14 day period may result in vol-
untary waiver. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 583.26(2)(b) (West Supp. 1987). In Iowa, Iowa H.F. 
2473, supra note 6, § 24, at 31 (to be codified at IOWA CoDE § 654A.11) states that "the 
borrower and the creditors may sign a statement prepared by the mediator that media-
tion was waived." This language, along with the provision in Iowa H.F. 2473 § 19 (to be 
codified at lowA CODE 654A.6(2)) that states "[t]he borrower may waive mediation after 
the initial consultation [with the mediation service)," is subject to the possible construc-
tion that waiver is not possible without first going through the formality of meeting with 
the mediation service. In actual practice, the debtor may return a waiver form provided 
in the information packet that he receives from the mediation service that is sent with 
the notice of a mediation request from a creditor. The packet thus appears to be the 
initial consultation for the purposes of the statute, although the notice to the debtor 
provides for a telephone consultation free of charge if the debtor has questions about the 
process or how to begin preparing for mediation. 
The issue of whether an alternative method of waiver is appropriate is not resolved. A 
source in the Iowa Attorney General's office has indicated that waiver on a form pro-
vided by the creditor may be effective. Telephone interview with Chuck Rutenbeck, Iowa 
Attorney General's Office, Farm Div. (July 25, 1986). The apparent concern here is to 
prevent the creditor from depriving the debtor who is not informed of his rights under 
the statute of the opportunity for mediation. 
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gives them the opportunity to attend the initial mediation meet-
ing. Creditors may also have some input in deciding who will 
serve as mediator. 81 
The statute defines the mediator's role in a manner that is 
consistent with the conceptual role of the mediator.82 Basically, 
the mediator listens to the parties, advises them of programs 
that may be able to assist them,83 and helps them in arriving at 
an agreement to adjust, refinance, or provide for payment of the 
debts.84 
The Minnesota statute requires the parties to meet in good 
faith; the mediator is empowered to determine if this standard is 
met. 86 Iowa has no good faith requirement within the statute, 
but the Farmer-Creditor Mediation Rules, promulgated by the 
Attorney General, include promoting good faith participation 
81. In Iowa, the mediation service provides the mediator without preselection by ei-
ther of the parties. The parties may remove the mediator, however, if one of the dispu-
tants can demonstrate that the mediator has close personal or professional relationships 
with one of the parties that would jeopardize neutrality. Iowa Admin. Bull. ch. 17, § 61-
17.11(3), 17.14(1) (1986). 
In Minnesota, the debtor and creditors have the right to strike one mediator from a 
list of three names presented to the parties prior to the initial meeting. In the event that 
the requests of the creditors would remove all three, the director appoints the mediator 
not excluded by the creditor owed the largest debt. If the debtor and creditor choose the 
same mediator, that mediator is appointed. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 583.26(4) (West Supp. 
1987). 
82. See supra text accompanying notes 25-38. 
83. In Iowa, the mediation service informs the debtor about programs for legal and 
financial planning assistance through an information packet or through telephone con-
sultation. The mediator does not make it a practice to direct the debtor toward such 
assistance during the mediation meeting. Interview with Liz Binger, Assistant Director of 
the Iowa Farmer/Creditor Mediation Service, in Des Moines, Iowa (Nov. 21, 1986) [here-
inafter Binger Interview]. 
84. Iowa H.F. 2473, supra note 6, § 22, at 31 (to be codified at low A CODE § 654A.9); 
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 583.26(6) (West Supp. 1987). 
85. The Minnesota statute explicitly provides for good faith participation, and in-
cludes examples of conduct not evidencing good faith, including: failure to attend and 
participate in meetings, failure of the debtor to make full disclosure of his financial obli-
gations, failure of the creditor to designate a representative having adequate authority to 
participate in the mediation, failure to provide a written statement of alternatives for 
restructuring debt and/or failure to provide reasons why alternatives presented are unac-
ceptable, and failure of a creditor to release necessary Jiving and operating expenses to 
the debtor. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 583.27(1) (West Supp. 1987). 
The mediator is responsible for determining compliance with standards of good faith. 
Id. § 583.27(2). Should the creditor fail to participate in good faith, the mediator may 
invoke court-supervised mediation. Id. § 583.27(3). If the creditor is still recalcitrant,the 
statute suspends his remedies for an additional 180 days and requires him to pay the 
debtor's attorney's fees and costs. Id. 
If the debtor does not participate in good faith, the mediator's affidavit so stating 
allows the creditor to proceed with its usual remedies. Id. § 583.27(4). 
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among the parties as one of the duties of the mediator.86 Meet-
ings may continue until the parties either reach agreement or 
the mediation period defined by statute has expired.87 An agree-
ment becomes a binding contract between them upon the signa-
ture of the parties. 88 If the parties fail to reach agreement, yet 
have fulfilled the requirement to meet in good faith,89 the credi-
tor may proceed with traditional legal remedies.90 
B. Iowa Approach to Problems of Forum and Funding 
The Iowa Farmer Creditor Mediation Service, Inc., is the or-
ganization that is responsible for providing mediation services in 
lowa.91 A director and support staff at a central office and eight 
regional coordinators, who are dispersed throughout the state, 
train, supervise, and provide support services for mediators. 92 
These mediators provide mediation services at neutral places ac-
ceptable to both the creditors and the debtor, which often may 
be the regional offices of the mediation service, but may include 
space provided by a local Farm Bureau office or church.93 
The mediators in the Iowa program come from all walks of 
life, including homemakers, farmers, business people, retirees, 
86. Iowa Admin. Bull. ch. 17, § 61-17.12(2)(d)(3) (1986). Although a legislative his-
tory is not available, it is possible that one of the reasons for leaving out a good faith 
requirement was to prevent lawsuits by debtors alleging that creditors failed to mediate 
in good faith. 
87. Iowa H.F. 2473, supra note 6, § 23, at 31 (to be codified at low A CODE § 654A.10), 
limits the total mediation period to 42 days following the initial request for mediation, 
subject to extension of up to 30 days upon petition by the borrower and all known credi-
tors. Id. § 25, at 32 (to be codified at IowA CODE § 654A.12). Minnesota's statute limits 
the mediation period to 60 days. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 583.26(8) (West Supp. 1987). Pre-
sumably, if all parties agree to continue meetings, nothing would prevent them from 
doing so. The significance of the extension of the mediation period is that the statute of 
limitations affecting rights in collateral stops running during this period. Iowa H.F. 2473, 
supra note 6, § 21(2), at 30-31 (to be codified at IOWA CODE § 654A.8(2)); MINN. STAT. 
ANN. § 583.26(5) (West Supp. 1987). 
88. The statute is not clear whether a creditor who has participated in mediation and 
agreed to restructure the debt is required to submit to mediation a second time should 
the debtor again default. The Iowa Farmer/Creditor Mediation Service's position is that 
the creditor need only offer to mediate once, and may proceed with a debt collection 
action should the debtor again be in default. Binger Interview, supra note 83. 
89. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text. 
90. Iowa H.F. 2473, supra note 6, § 19, at 29-30 (to be codified at IOWA CODE 
§ 654A.6); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 583.26(1) (West Supp, 1987). 
91. Iowa Admin. Bull. ch. 17, § 61-17.1 (1986). 
92. Binger Interview, supra note 83; see also Iowa Admin. Bull. ch. 17, § 61-17.4(1). 
(6) (1986). 
93. Binger Interview, supra note 83. 
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and lawyers.9" Candidates are selected from applicants who can 
demonstrate the necessary qualifications, including good written 
and verbal communication skills, the ability to relate to other 
people, and flexible thinking.911 An agriculture background is not 
necessary to participate in the program.96 
Candidates participate in a formal training program consisting 
of approximately forty hours of group exercises, role playing, 
and discussion designed to familiarize the participants with the 
mediation process. 97 An additional function of the training pro-
gram is to allow participants to determine if they possess the 
personal characteristics necessary to perform as a mediator.98 
Training focuses minimally on the substantive issues of debtor/ 
creditor relationships, as the major emphasis is on the process of 
mediation. 99 Regional coordinators provide continuing training 
as the mediators develop skills while resolving actual disputes. 100 
The budget for the mediation service's first year of operation 
is $790,100.101 The State of Iowa provides $100,000 (12.66 % ), 
and fees assessed against disputants are to generate the remain-
der of the funding. 102 Thus, the creditors and debtors involved 
in the disputes theoretically bear the majority of the cost of the 
mediation service, with only a small portion of the cost directly 
borne by the general public through government financing. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. 
98. Id. 
99. Id. 
100. Id. 
101. Iowa Farmer/Creditor Mediation Service 1986-1987 Budget, provided in Binger 
Interview, supra note 83 (copy on file with U. MICH. J.L. REF.). 
102. The budgeted expenditure of $790,100 is based on an estimate of 7200 cases for 
the year. Binger Interview, supra note 83. Based on this estimate, the average cost per 
case would be approximately $109.74 ($790,100/7200 cases). Of this amount, state funds 
provide approximately $13.89 per case ($100,000/7200 cases). 
Each party participating in the mediation is charged $25 per hour. (For example, if the 
debtor and three creditors are present, the total fee is $100 per hour.) The mediator is 
paid $23.50 per hour, plus expenses. Multiple creditors are not often present, however, as 
indicated in the income statement of October 31, 1986 showing approximately 50% of 
mediation income was paid to mediators. Iowa Farmer/Creditor Mediation Service, In-
come Statement of October 31, 1986, provided in Binger Interview, supra note 83. For 
further observations regarding multiple-creditor mediation, see infra note 115. 
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C. Preliminary Results of the Iowa Farmer/Creditor 
Mediation Service 
The Iowa Farmer/Creditor Mediation Service's operations 
commenced in early July 1986.103 Iowa law requires all creditors 
seeking to foreclose upon or repossess agricultural property se-
curing debt· greater than $20,000 to offer to mediate with the 
debtor. 10• The mandatory offer by creditors provides an oppor-
tunity to evaluate the overall effectiveness of mediation in 
resolving disputes concerning debtor default, as the empirical 
data reflects all debtor/creditor cases within the threshold crite-
ria, not merely those in which the creditor is particularly amena-
ble to alternatives to repossession. 105 
1. Debtor and creditor response- Through the first four 
months of operation, ending October 31, 1986, the mediation 
service received a total of 3607 requests for mediation.106 The 
103. Binger Interview, supra note 83. 
104. Iowa H.F. 2473, supra note 6, § 17, at 29 (to be codified at lowA CooE § 654A.4). 
105. Goldberg, Green & Sander, ADR Problems and Prospects: Looking to the Fu-
ture, 69 JUDICATURE 291, 294 (1986). 
106. The following represents the total caseload statistics of the Iowa Farmer Credi-
tor Mediation Service through the first four months of operation ending October 31, 
1986: 
Total Requests 3607 
Open 649 
Closed 2958 
Staff Release 1292 
Waiver 189 
Conciliated 206 
Transferred 13 
Mediated* 1278 
Agreement 700 
No Agreement 568 
Relevant Definitions: 
Percentage of 
Cases Closed 
100.00% 
43.68% 
6.39% 
6.96% 
0.44% 
43.20% 
23.66% 
19.20% 
Percentage of 
Cases Mediated 
100.00% 
54.77% 
44.44% 
Open: Case is still pending. Either the debtor has not yet waived mediation through 
return of a waiver form or through lapse of the 21-day statutory period, or if mediation 
was selected, mediation proceedings are not yet complete. 
Closed: Case resolved for purposes of the mediation service through completion of medi-
ation or through waiver. 
Staff Release: Involuntary waiver signed by mediation service staff because debtor failed 
to respond to the request for mediation within the 21 day period. 
Waiver: Express voluntary waiver by the debtor. 
Conciliated: Parties had selected mediation, but either reached an agreement or the 
debtor cured the default prior to participating in a mediation meeting. 
Mediated: Parties participated in at least one mediation meeting as required by Iowa 
law. 
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service closed 2958 cases107 during this period, leaving 649 cases 
still pending.108 Of the 2958 cases closed during this period, ap-
proximately one-half of the debtors responded favorably to par-
ticipating in mediation: the parties actually participated in me-
diation in 43 % of the cases, 109 and the parties conciliated prior 
to mediation in 6 % of the cases. no 
In the mediated cases, the debtor and creditor reached an 
agreement approximately 55 % of the time, m representing 24 % 
of the total cases closed during the period. 112 Thus, when concili-
ations are included, agreements were reached or defaults were 
cured in approximately 30% of all of the potential debt collec-
tion actions filed µuring the period. na Considering the fact that 
approximately 50% of the debtors waived the opportunity to 
mediate, 114 thereby reducing the number of cases in which the 
parties were able to attempt to reach an agreement, this data 
presents a strong case for the efficacy of statutory mediation. 
Although no hard data were available indicating the actual 
number of creditors participating, multiple creditors did partici-
pate in mediation. 1111 Thus, the conceptual constraint of the 
dyad modeln6 is not insurmountable. 
2. Mediation program costs not prohibitive- An analysis of 
the operating expenses of the mediation service for the first four 
months of operation indicates an average cost of approximately 
$263 per mediated case in which an agreement is reached117 or 
Agreement: Parties reached a mutually acceptable solution, which could include restruc-
turing debt repayment or surrendering collateral. 
• There is a minor discrepancy in the report concerning the number'of cases mediated. 
The "Agreement" and "No Agreement" categories total only 1268 cases, which is 10 
cases short of the total cases mediated. For purposes of this study, these cases will be 
considered in the "No Agreement" category. This discrepancy has no effect on the con-
clusions drawn below. 
107. See supra note 106. 
108. Id. 
109. Id. 
110. Id. 
111. Id. 
112. Id. 
113. Id. 
114. Id. 
115. Binger Interview, supra note 83. Binger observed that although multiple credi-
tor mediation occurred infrequently, mediation with multiple creditors often went better 
than two-party mediation. The parties seemed better prepared for mediation and better 
able to discuss relevant facts. Telephone Interview with Liz Binger, Assistant Director of 
the Iowa Farmer/Creditor Mediation Service (Feb. 27, 1987). 
116. See supra note 42. 
117. The Iowa Farmer/Creditor Mediation Service incurred actual expenses of 
$183,884.31 (unaudited) during the first four months of operation, ending October 31, 
1986. Mediators' hourly wages and mileage (approximately 30%) and salaries of adminis-
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approximately $144 per mediated case. 118 Given the requirement 
that the amount of debt involved must be at least $20,000,119 
these costs are not prohibitive.120 
Ill. EVALUATION: EXTENDING MEDIATION BEYOND THE 
AGRICULTURAL CONTEXT INTO OTHER BUSINESS AND CONSUMER 
DEBT 
Mediation effects a balancing of the interests of both debtors 
and creditors in achieving a fair resolution of the problems of 
the agricultural credit crisis. Debtors receive every possible op-
portunity to work out an alternative structure of repayment, and 
creditors are spared from such draconian measures as mortgage 
foreclosure moratoria121 or more permissive bankruptcy laws122 
that may severely restrict creditors' rights in collateral. Borrow-
ers who are current with debt repayments but are dependent 
upon further extensions of credit to operate avoid the credit-
restricting effects of more radical measures. 
trators and staff (approximately 30%) constitute the greatest percentage of the total 
expenditures. The remainder is overhead expenses, some of which would represent non-
recurring start-up costs (approximately 5'1,, of total costs). 
The estimated cost of $263 is based on the total expenses of the period ($183,884.31) 
divided by the total number of cases mediated in which agreement was reached (700). 
118. This estimated cost is based on the total expenses of the period ($183,884.31) 
divided by total number of cases mediated (1278). The mediation service incurs costs for 
preparing and mailing notices to all debtors whether or not they choose to mediate. Such 
costs are included in this estimate; thus, actual costs may be less. 
119. Iowa H.F. 2473, supra note 6, § 17, at 29 (to be codified at lowA CooE § 654A.4). 
The minimum debt is $20,000, and in many cases the amount in controversy may be 
substantially higher than $20,000. 
120. For example, should the farmer decide to file Chapter 11 bankruptcy, one source 
estimates the legal costs alone to be $10,000 to $15,000. Taylor, New Hope for Hard-
Pressed Farmers, FARM J., Dec. 1986, at 22, 23. With attorney fees at $100 per hour, even 
less complex legal action could quickly equal or surpass these mediation cost estimates. 
121. A mortgage foreclosure moratorium restricts a creditor's rights in collateral for a 
prescribed time period by preventing foreclosure actions against a debtor in default, thus 
giving the debtor a legal right to delay meeting an obligation. Historically, statutes pro-
viding for moratoria have been passed in response to an economic crisis. Minnesota has a 
mortgage moratorium statute in effect. M1NN. STAT. ANN. §§ 583.01-.12 (West Supp. 
1987). See generally Annotation, Financial Depression as Justification of Moratorium 
or Other Relief to Mortgagor (Including Decisions Under Statutes in That Regard), 104 
A.L.R. 375, 377-82 (1936). 
122. See Taylor, supra note 120, at 22-23. The new Chapter 12 bankruptcy provisions 
have debt forgiveness features that, according to a spokesman for the American Bankers 
Association, will "pressure banks to get out of agricultural lending." Id. at 23. 
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A. Extension of Statutory Mediation to Other Business Debt 
Given the similar problems faced in business debt relation-
ships involving agricultural and nonagricultural property, a per-
suasive argument can be made for extending mediation to 
debtor/creditor relationships in other business contexts. Al-
though states passed mediation statutes in response to a crisis in 
the agricultural economy, the positive effects of preventing pre-
mature termination of the debtor/creditor relationship, while 
placing only a minimal burden on the creditor's interests. in col-
lateral, merit consideration even though there is currently no 
corresponding crisis in the nonagricultural business credit 
environment. 
One may argue, however, that if communication to achieve 
consensual resolution is the primary goal of mediation, govern-
mental intrusion in the form of required mediation is an unnec-
essary burden upon debtors and creditors if negotiation to 
restructure debt is already a common practice.123 A conclusion 
that statutory mediation is unnecessary does not necessarily fol-
low from this argument. 
1. Advantages of mediation over negotiation- The fact that 
some creditors may negotiate with debtors to restructure the re-
payment of debt is not dispositive of the issue of whether media-
tion is necessary in the business debtor/creditor context. There 
are certainly situations in which the parties fail to negotiate, 124 
or in which the parties fail to reach an agreement through nego-
tiation. The mediator's functions in facilitating communication, 
proposing alternatives, and expanding the parties' knowledge of 
resources for assistance present a potentially superior opportu-
nity to achieve a solution that is not available through pure ne-
gotiation;1211 negotiation is not a substitute for mediation. 
Data from the Iowa mediation program support the efficacy of 
mediation. Although the creditor had to offer to mediate, media-
123. Although there are no specific data available concerning the practices of com-
mercial lenders, some authorities have shown that negotiation of alternative repayment 
plans is common in other loan contexts, particularly automobile loans. See White, supra 
note 55, at 515 n.43; see also Note, Caveat Venditor: Greater Restriction of Remedial 
Self-Help in Consumer Transactions, 9 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 756 (1975). In a survey of the 
consumer practices of Boston area banks, all respondents "claimed to be conscientious" 
in resorting to repossession only after phone calls, letters, notices of maturity, and at-
tempts to work out alternative payment arrangements. Id. at 789. The author cautioned, 
however, that the small number of respondents precluded any fair conclusions about 
creditor practices. Id. 
124. See, e.g., supra note 5. 
125. H. RAIFFA, supra note 24, at 130. 
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tion was not mandatory, and debtors could waive it if they de-
sired.126 Despite the option of waiver, nearly fifty percent of the 
debtors chose to participate in mediation.127 These results indi-
cate that the debtors believed that mediation would be helpful. 
The fact that nearly fifty-five percent of the debtors who elected 
to mediate reached an agreement confirms that mediation was in 
fact helpful. 128 
2. Minimal economic burdens of mediation- The data from 
the Iowa mediation program show that the economic burdens 
placed on the debtor and creditor by a mediation statute are 
minimal. Total direct costs of providing mediation services as a 
percentage of the debt involved were well below one percent.129 
Furthermore, requiring mediation does not increase indirect 
costs that may include the time spent by each of the parties and 
the delay in repossessing property. 
Creditors who practice negotiation in good faith already com-
mit the time they might spend in mediation to negotiation. The 
only additional burdens the statute places upon them are the 
creditor's share of the mediator's cost. Because debtors have the 
right to waive mediation,130 the requirement to mediate imposes 
only a minimal inconvenience on those who do not wish to par-
ticipate in mediation because they are mutually satisfied with 
their business relationship and ability to resolve disputes. The 
mediation statute thus limits many of the abusive situations 
where the debtor is unnecessarily put out of business by credi-
tors acting in bad faith, while placing very little burden on the 
creditor who practices good faith negotiation with regard to debt 
collection practices. 
Proper drafting can alleviate creditors' concerns that the 
debtor could use the mediation statute to drag out the collection 
process. Some states require waiting periods that provide the 
debtor with the right to cure default before a creditor may seek 
legal remedies to collect the debt. 181 Rather than tolling during 
mediation, those time periods may run concurrently with the 
126. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text. 
127. See supra note 106. 
128. Id. 
129. See supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text. 
130. Iowa H.F. 2473, supra note 6, § 19(2), at 30 .(to be codified at low A CooE 
§ 654A.6(2)); see also notes 79-80 and accompanying text. 
131. See, e.g., Iowa H.F. 2473, supra note 6, § 15, at 28 (to be codified at low A CooE 
§ 654A.2). 
WINTER 1987) Debtor/Creditor Mediation 609 
mediation period.132 The mediation request provides notice for 
the debtor, who can then prepare to take action to protect his 
rights. If the statutory waiting period between notice of default 
and the right to repossess is not tolled, delay is eliminated. Stat-
utory requirements of good faith in negotiation can limit the 
debtor's ability to use the mediation period as a delay tactic 
where the waiting,-period establishing a right to cure is greater 
than the mediation period. 133 
Proper drafting can also alleviate creditors' legitimate con-
cerns with delay when the value of the collateral is rapidly de-
clining. A provision allowing waiver of mediation through a 
court determination that delay would cause the creditor to suffer 
irreparable harm can prevent loss. 134 Thus, the costs imposed by 
delay need not be a problem. 
3. Mediation clauses in security agreements: A nonstatutory 
option- Even if one rejects statutory mediation as a prerequi-
site to debt collection, mediation clauses within the security 
agreement present a viable alternative that may provide numer-
ous benefits for both debtor and creditor. The offer to mediate is 
a good business practice for the creditor because it enhances the 
opportunity to reach an agreement in which both parties are ec-
onomic winners. The Iowa program data indicated that nearly 
one-fourth of the debtors in default worked out agreements of 
some type with creditors through mediation, m thus indicating 
that both parties preferred the consensual result achieved. Re-
search in the area of small claims mediation indicates that dis-
putants are more likely to be responsible about fulfilling their 
obligations when they have participated in making an agreement 
with the other party. 136 An analogous result is probable when 
each party considers the needs of the other in agreeing to 
restructure payments, rather than presenting ultimatums.137 
132. Iowa H.F. 2473, supra note 6, § 19(1), at 29 (to be codified at lowA CODE 
§ 654A.6(1)). But see id. § 21(2), at 30-31 (to be codified at lowA CODE § 654A.8(2)); 
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 583.26(5) (West Supp. 1987). 
133. The Minnesota statute allows the mediator to determine whether the parties are 
participating in good faith according to specified criteria, thus allowing the creditor to 
take immediate action if the debtor breaches the duty of good faith. MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 583.27(2) (West Supp. 1987); see supra note 85. 
134. Iowa H.F. 2473, supra note 6, § 19(1) at 29, 30 (to be codified at lowA CODE 
§ 654A.6(1)). 
135. See supra note 106. 
136. McEwen & Maiman, Small Claims Mediation in Maine: An Empirical Assess-
ment, 33 ME. L. REV. 237, 261 (1981). Goldberg, Green and Sander have criticized this 
research. Goldberg, Green & Sander, supra note 105, at 294. 
137. The Iowa Farmer/Creditor Mediation Service reaches this same conclusion and 
states in informational material: "The benefits of mediation are numerous. Perhaps the 
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A further benefit of mediation for the creditor, who would 
otherwise seek to satisfy a debt through self-help repossession, is 
that he may avoid tort claims for bad faith or wrongful reposses-
sion. Recent cases have demonstrated that a debtor may hold a 
creditor liable for conversion where he failed to give advance no-
tice of intent to repossess collateral. 138 The creditor may avoid 
liability if he offers to mediate with the debtor and notifies the 
debtor of his willingness to pursue the option of repossession if 
an alternative payment agreement cannot be reached. 
4. Implementing the program: alternative solutions to the 
problems of funding and forum- The institutional mechanism 
designed in Iowa to provide services and allocate the costs of 
those services is potentially applicable and easily adaptable to 
other business debt. Alternatives to the institutional approach 
adopted in Iowa are available, however, and merit consideration. 
Although one can argue that the parties to the mediation 
should bear the costs of a mediation program because they are 
the immediate beneficiaries of the service, public funding of a 
portion of the service is an option. At least one state has funded 
an alternative dispute resolution program by taxing fees to liti-
gants in state courts and allocating them for use in dispute reso-
lution programs.139 This method would expose litigants to the 
availability of mediation, and may provide an additional incen-
tive to use mediation services rather than the courts. The use of 
public funds to underwrite the settlement of private disputes is 
defensible, because an attendant consequence of extrajudicial 
resolution of disputes is the alleviation of caseload pressures on 
the courts. 140 The benefits of preventing premature termination 
of a business also inure to the public, thus justifying public 
expenditures. 
most important is its effectiveness in resolving emotional and factual issues in a dispute. 
Other benefits include . . . its participatory nature, which results in a strong commit-
ment by the parties to adhere to the agreements reached." Iowa Farmer/Creditor Media-
tion Service Informational Sheet, provided in Binger Interview, supra note 83 (copy on 
file with U. M1cH. J.L. REF.). 
Due to the relatively short period that the service has been operating, sufficient data is 
not available to test the accuracy of this assertion in the debtor/creditor context. 
138. See National Consumer Law Center, Inc., Is Advance Notice Required Before a 
Self-Help Repossession?, 19 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1304 (1986); White, Representing the 
Low-Income Consumer in Repossessions, Resales and Deficiency Judgments Cases, 3 
U.C.C. L.J. 199, 217 (1971). 
139. T.Ex. REV. C1v. STAT. ANN.§ 2372aa (Vernon Supp. 1987) (providing financing for 
an adjunct system to the courts). 
140. R. COULSON, supra note 11, at 28-29. 
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One alternative to an institutional approach is the use of pri-
vate mediators, who are already used in labor disputes.1•~ Pri-
vate mediators may be most appropriate where both parties are 
reasonably sophisticated and already have resources available to 
appraise adequately their rights. 
One problem with using private mediators is lack of certainty 
about the mediator's qualifications. The person to whom dispu-
tants usually turn for help in dispute resolution, the attorney, is 
not necessarily qualified to be a mediator.142 Mediation services 
are available for commercial disputes, but are not always conve-
niently available in all geographic regions in which they may be 
required, 143 and they are considerably more expensive than 
those provided in the Iowa program. 144 
Advocates of professionalizing mediation support the creation 
of a class of certified public mediators who have satisfied certain 
training requirements.1411 Professionalization may significantly 
increase the availability of qualified private mediators a:nd im-
prove the feasibility of a noninstitutional approach to providing 
mediation services for debtor/creditor disputes. 
141. J. DUNLOP, supra note 47, at 140. The Federal Mediation and Conciliation Ser-
vice, an independent executive agency of the federal government created in 1947 to facil-
itate the resolution of labor-management conflicts, has also provided labor mediators. 
Susskind, supra note 63, at 4 n.9. Thus, an institutional alternative is available. 
142. Riskin, supra note 7, at 39-47. 
Most lawyers neither understand nor perform mediation nor have a strong inter-
est in doing either. At least three interrelated reasons account for this: the way 
most lawyers, as lawyers, look at the world; the economics and structure of con-
temporary law practice; and the lack of training in mediation for lawyers. 
Id. at 43. Particularly troublesome are the lawyer's assumptions of the adversarial nature 
of the parties and the lawyer's penchant for the application of rules as a means of dis-
pute resolution. Id. at 43-44; see also Watson, Mediation and Negotiation: Learning to 
Deal with Psychological Responses, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 293, 293-96 (1985) (emphasiz-
ing the need for lawyers to be educated about the psychological aspects of mediation in 
order to be effective). 
143. A directory for mediation services is available, but many of these services are 
geared specifically toward family or community disputes and thus may not be appropri-
ate in commercial contexts; see ABA DISPUTE RESOLUTION DIRECTORY supra note 46. 
144. American Arbitration Ass'n, Fee Schedule, reprinted in R. COULSON, supra note 
11, at 46 (showing claims-i"anging from $1 to $1.5 million and corresponding fees from 
$250 to $850 per party). 
145. See R. CouLSON, supra note 11, at 20-26; see also Note, The Dilemma of Regu-
lating Mediation, 22 Hous. L. REV. 841 (1985). 
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Although mediation is conceptually applicable in the context 
of consumer debt,148 practical difficulties in the consumer con-
text make required mediation infeasible in many circumstances. 
The costs of mediation applied to the relatively small value of 
many consumer loans limit the application of mediation to those 
cases that can economically justify the expenditure of resources 
to mediate an agreement. Without funding mediation services so 
that the parties to the disputes do not have to bear the entire 
cost, 147 the scope of practical implementation is limited to big-
ticket items, such as automobiles. 
"In extending consumer credit, the creditor is chiefly con-
cerned that legal remedies provide inexpensive and effective 
means_ for investment recovery if the consumer fails to fulfill 
agreement terms. "148 The fact that mediation takes time does 
not necessarily jeopardize the effectiveness of the creditor's rem-
edies. Data on current lending practices indicate that consumer 
lenders already delay acts of repossession or judicial action to 
enforce security interests for a substantial period after the 
debtor is in default. 149 In addition, research indicates that a sub-
stantial amount of contact occurs between the debtor and credi-
tor before repossession. uo If the creditor is willing to make an 
effort to negotiate with the debtor, an offer to negotiate with the 
assistance of a mediator would place only a minimal burden on 
146. A neutral third party could help the debtor to appraise realistically the possibil-
ity of repayment or to commit himself to a repayment agreement. See McEwen & 
Maiman, supra note 136, at 250, 267. 
147. One possibility is funding a mediation service by assessing part of the finance 
charge paid by each credit customer. Although an effective means of spreading the costs, 
the assessment presents a fairness issue-consumers who pay debts faithfully would fund 
part of the costs of services for those who are financially irresponsible. 
148. National Comm'n on Consumer Finance, Report-Consumer Credit in the 
United States 27 (1972), reprinted in L. FuLI,ER & M. EISENBERG, BASIC CoNTRACT LAW 
733 (4th ed. 1981). 
149. Mentschikoff, supra note 55, at 779 n.35 (discussing that one bank officer re-
ported a policy of a 90-day waiting period after default before pursuing repossession). 
150. White, supra note 55, at 515 n.43. A survey in 1971 by the Consumers Bankers 
Association in Washington, D.C., revealed the following activity, on average, preceding 
each repossession: 
Written extensions or rewrites 3.6 
Delinquency notices sent 10.3 
Telephone calls 12.2 
Personal contacts 7.9 
The source of the study cautioned that because a group of small banks was the subject of 
the survey, the average number of personal contacts may be higher than the national 
average. Id. 
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the honest creditor acting in good faith. The only professional 
help that the parties require is the mediator, and he need not 
have elaborate training. m The parties need no special personnel 
to perform the negotiating tasks. 
Creditors pursue negotiation and contact with consumer debt-
ors out of self-interest.m Pursuing the benefits of mediation by 
providing a neutral forum in which the debtor may be assured of 
being heard and receiving assistance in evaluating the realistic 
possibilities of repaying the debt is consistent with the self-
interest of the creditor. uis Persons who have had a part in con-
structing an agreement are more likely to assume responsibility 
for their part of the agreement. m A mediated solution, giving 
the creditor a better opportunity for repayment, may thus be 
superior to a solution that is merely imposed on the debtor. 
Self-interest may support a voluntary mediation program, or 
the inclusion of a mediation clause in the security agreement. 
Statutorily mandated mediation, however, depends upon other 
social values that are implicated when creditor's rights in collat-
eral are affected. Even if the actual effect of requiring consumer 
mediation for large consumer debts is minimal, those skeptical 
of the benefits of mediation may view an additional barrier in 
the credit process as a costly additional protection for the debtor 
with little reciprocal benefit to society. Repossession of con-
sumer items does not present the magnitude of adverse social 
effects-loss of employment, tax revenue, and economic influ-
ence in the community-that result from terminating a business. 
The owners, employees, and the community lose when reposses-
sion of collateral terminates a business prematurely. Some au-
thorities consider the benefits of preventing wrongful reposses-
sion where the consumer is not really in default or the consumer 
has a legitimate defense to be minimal. 11111 Although these au-
thorities do not measure the human costs involved, they show 
that the social commitment to placing further restrictions on the 
debtor/creditor relationship in the consumer context may not 
support a statutory solution. 
151. See supra text accompanying notes 94-100. 
152. See supra text accompanying note 148. 
153. Mediation is not a form of a consumer credit counseling service, as discussed in 
note 66, supra, although the mediator may refer the debtor to assistance. 
154. See supra notes 135-36 and accompanying text. 
155. Mentschikoff, supra npte 55, at 778 (concluding that a prior judicial hearing as a 
safeguard to prevent wrongful repossession for reasons of fraud, unconscionability, or 
breach of warranty might help keep one in ten thousand debtors from losing the use of 
his automobile for 10-60 days); see also White, supra note 55, at 528-29. 
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Mediation as a statutory prerequisite to a debt collection ac-
tion potentially has limited application in the context of large 
consumer debts, and its benefits merit examination by business 
persons and consumer advocates. Any conclusion about the effi-
cacy of mediation in the consumer context requires more re-
search concerning the actual costs of mediation with consumers, 
the consumer response to the opportunity for mediation, and the 
economic benefits in the context of consumer debt. 
CONCLUSION 
Mediation offers a viable method of helping debtors and credi-
tors develop alternatives to terminating the· debtor/creditor rela-
tionship through repossession of security. The mediator's posi-
tion as a neutral third party facilitates the negotiating process 
and brings a fresh perspective to potential solutions. As an agent 
of reality, the mediator exposes unrealistic expectations of both 
parties and helps each of them to understand the possibility of 
settlement. As an expander of resources, the mediator directs 
the parties to agencies or persons who can assist them in pro-
tecting their legal rights or in meeting their obligations under 
the contract. 
Despite the potential conceptual difficulties of mediation in-
volving more than one creditor, mediation has proved successful 
in the context of agricultural loans. Similarities in agricultural 
and other business contexts make statutory mediation both 
practical and desirable as long as the threshold amount of debt 
involved makes incurring the costs of mediation economically 
feasible. 
The practical difficulties of implementing mediation as a stat-
utory requirement present the greatest problem in the context of 
consumer debt. Limited economic feasibility would make media-
tion inapplicable in a substantial number of consumer purchases 
involving lower-priced items. Because termination of a consumer 
debtor/creditor relationship has less of an impact on the society 
than in the business context, the social commitment to provid-
ing restrictions upon the enforcement of credit in the consumer 
context may be insufficient to support a statutory requirement 
to mediate. If more research in the consumer context reveals ec-
onomic benefits of mediation with consumers, greater emphasis 
on contractual agreements to mediate may result as creditors 
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pursue self-interest in restructuring payment of the debt, rather 
than repossessing and selling the collateral. 
-Edward A. Morse 

